Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor

Proposed Action Memorandum

November 15, 2023

Issuing regulations under the Immigration and Nationality Act to ban non-compete and stay-or-pay contracts among foreign-educated nurses

I. Introduction

Health systems and staffing agencies that hire foreign-educated nurses (“FENs”) to the United States under employment-based visa categories commonly use restrictive employment contracts, like stay-or-pay agreements, to further constrain an already-vulnerable workforce. Stay-or-pay contracts require a worker to pay what are often referred to in the industry as “breach fees”\(^1\) if they resign or are terminated before a specific amount of time has passed. This looming financial penalty traps FENs in jobs with low wages and unsafe working conditions, and threatens patient health and safety. The proliferation of these contracts also harms domestically-trained nurses by suppressing their wages, inducing them to accept worse job conditions to compete with FENs, and by making FENs even more attractive to employers as a highly captive segment of the workforce.

This memorandum proposes that the Department of Labor (“DOL”) update its regulations under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), which govern the permanent labor certification process, to prohibit employers from subjecting workers to restrictive employment contracts that would require them to pay their employer if they resign, are terminated, or attempt to find another job. This action would follow previous DOL action in similar contexts that sought to reduce the coercive effects of employer-driven debt on foreign workers.\(^2\)

II. Justification

A. Stay-or-pay contracts for foreign-educated nurses

Restrictive employment contract provisions like traditional non-compete, breach, and liquidated damages\(^3\) clauses and training repayment agreement provisions (“TRAPs”)\(^4\) – collectively, stay-or-pay contracts – are ubiquitous throughout the healthcare industry. Although the specifics of the arrangements vary, they all have the effect of immobilizing workers by imposing a financial penalty on them if they choose to leave (and, in some cases, if they are terminated). For example, up to 80 percent of certified registered nurse anesthetists are


\(^2\) See, e.g., Employment and Training Administration, Labor Certification Process and Enforcement for Temporary Employment in Occupations Other Than Agriculture or Registered Nursing in the United States (H-2B Workers), and Other Technical Changes, 73 Fed. Reg. 78020, 78037 (implementing various changes, including requiring employers to cover certain expenses, to the H-2B visa program to reduce “conditions akin to indentured servitude, driving down wages and working conditions for all workers, foreign and domestic”).

\(^3\) A liquidated damages provision includes a generalized financial penalty that accounts for broad claimed expenses like training, recruitment, and onboarding costs. Zoe Salzman, Liquidated Damages Clauses in Employment Agreements, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/aba_journal_of_labor_employment_law/v34/number-2/liquidated-damages-clauses.pdf (comparing liquidated damages clauses to non-compete agreements in their effects of preventing worker mobility).

\(^4\) A TRAP requires a worker who is fired or quits before a set period of time to pay the employer for the cost of on-the-job training received. See Student Borrower Protection Center, Trapped at Work 3, (July 2022), https://protectborrowers.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Trapped-at-Work_Final.pdf (hereinafter “Trapped at Work report”).
currently subject to traditional non-compete clauses.\(^5\) In 2022, National Nurses United ("NNU") conducted a survey of registered nurses and found that about half of respondents were required to participate in a training or residency program during their career; 55 percent of the registered nurses working in hospitals who participated in such programs reported being required to repay their employer for the cost of their training if they departed the hospital before their employment contract expired.\(^6\) TRAPs are often deployed at less desirable hospitals with unsafe working or patient care conditions, including at the largest for-profit healthcare system in the country, HCA Healthcare.\(^7\) Indeed, TRAPs have become so ubiquitous in the healthcare sector that nurses who purposefully search for jobs that do not require TRAPs can struggle to find them.\(^8\)

These employment practices are especially common among healthcare employers – primarily health systems and, increasingly, healthcare staffing agencies – that recruit FENs to work in the United States.\(^9\) The prevalence of such practices is difficult to precisely quantify, in part because there is not a comprehensive database of the contracts under which workers with employment-based visas are hired.\(^10\) However, according to a report supported by the MacArthur Foundation and another from the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), it is standard industry practice to require FENs to commit to a single employer for

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\(^7\) Trapped at Work report at 15.

\(^8\) Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Issue Spotlight: Consumer risks posed by employer-driven debt, (Jul. 20, 2023), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/issue-spotlight-consumer-risks-posed-by-employer-driven-debt/full-report (hereinafter “CFPB Report”). Consider one example of how HCA uses TRAPs to immobilize workers and reduce their bargaining power:

Newly hired new graduate RNs seeking employment at HCA Healthcare’s Mission Hospital in Asheville, NC and a number of other HCA Healthcare hospitals are required to sign a [Training Repayment Agreement] with HCA Healthcare subsidiary HealthTrust, a health care industry supply chain management company . . . Under the contract, HealthTrust requires newly graduated nurses—who are fully licensed and working as RNs in HCA Healthcare hospitals — to complete the company-run StarRN program to receive so-called nursing coursework. Under the contract, these newly graduated nurses are required to take out a $10,000 promissory note for program costs and must for years accept suppressed wages that are frequently lower than other RNs working in the same job but outside the StarRN program. Additionally, as temporary employees these nurses do not receive benefits. After completing the program, nurses are required to work full-time for HCA Healthcare for two years or else they must repay the promissory note. RNs working at Mission Hospital who are in the StarRN program make a set rate of $24 an hour, potentially depressing wage growth, while the hourly median wage for RNs in the state is $32.13.

HCA is not alone, of course: UCHealth, MedStar Health, and other health systems also use TRAPs, for which the payback amounts range from $5,000 to $50,000. Trapped at Work report quoting National Nurses United, Comment Submitted on Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Merger Enforcement No. FTC-2022-0003 (Apr. 21, 2022), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2022-0003-1831; CFPB Report.


\(^10\) NNU Comment at 2.
Stay-or-pay contracts among FENs are often accompanied by other dishonest and low-road employer practices. For example, some nurses are not told of the stay-or-pay commitment until after they have worked with an employer to apply for a visa, or even after they have moved to the United States. Some employers place FENs in substandard housing upon arrival to the United States. Some healthcare staffing agencies also refuse to pay FENs when they are “benched” between assignments, permitting those employers to keep captive workers on standby without pay until positions become available, in conflict with the requirement that nursing green cards be made available only for workers in full-time and permanent employment. When they do pay, agency employers using FENs are also more likely to pay nurses substantially less than nurses, foreign and domestic, that are hired directly by health systems. This is in part because prevailing wage determination is often done at the time of agency recruitment, which can often be years before a FEN starts work – leaving their wage below the market rate. For example, a Filipina nurse at Health Carousel, LLC, an international healthcare recruiting and staffing agency, learned upon starting her placement in Pennsylvania that she was paid much less than other nurses, earning only $25.50 per hour compared to more than $35 per hour. The nurse was troubled by the work, which she found to be brutal and often dangerous due to understaffing, and the healthcare staffing agency exerted intense control over her life – for example, by not allowing her to discuss working conditions with other staff or leave town without the agency’s permission. When the nurse decided she needed to leave her job, the staffing agency invoked the contract she had signed in the Philippines and demanded $20,000, which she paid with money her boyfriend had been saving for years to buy a house. Similar stories of exploitation by nurse staffing agencies are all-too-common.

B. Exploitation enabled by stay-or-pay contracts

Stay-or-pay contracts for FENs further immobilize an already-vulnerable workforce. Due to the fact that they must acquire employer sponsorship to come to the country and that contractual provisions and employers sometimes dishonestly imply that there are potential immigration consequences for leaving a job, FENs are

13 NNU Comment at 23.
15 Pittman report at 5.
already more likely than United States workers to feel tied to their employer. FENs are typically recruited in their country of origin through carefully orchestrated events that offer potential workers an often-misleading glimpse of a luxurious lifestyle in the United States. Recruiters make promises that go unfulfilled, and require investments or contractual commitments early in the process before the workers have a full picture of the conditions of their eventual United States-based placement, which can often be quite poor. Add on top of this scheme a financial penalty for separating from their health system or staffing agency employer — either through resignation or termination — and dishonest threats of deportation, and FENs are subject to intense and often coercive pressure to remain with their employer.

These clauses limit employees’ ability to exit a job, raising the stakes of termination or quitting, and depriving them of leverage to raise concerns about workplace conditions. In many cases, the monetary sum that workers would have to pay out to their employer in the event of resignation or termination is prohibitively large. For example, the Department of Labor recently filed a complaint under the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that the liquidated damages provision utilized by a healthcare staffing agency would have required its FEN employee to repay all income that he grossed during the entirety of his employment, thus depriving him of the statutorily mandated minimum wage. Even when such contractual provisions are not enforced, or are not legally enforceable, they have an in terrorem effect, and their mere existence may pressure workers into

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20 There are ways for workers to transfer their visa to work for another employer, and the process was simplified by the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000. But it is certainly not frictionless, so workers are more likely to feel stuck with their original sponsor employer.
22 Id.
25 Of course, the Immigration and Nationality Act is not the only law that may protect workers from the negative consequences of stay-or-pay contracts. State laws and common law on wage and hour requirements and contract unconscionability may also be applicable and more protective. See, e.g., See Complaint, Scally v. PetSmart LLC, case no. — (Sup. Ct. Cal. San Mateo Jul. 2022), https://towardsjustic.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/PetSmart-complaint_file-1.pdf (based on state wage law requiring indemnification of an employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her obedience to the directions of the employer, regardless of whether those expenses pull the employee’s wages under the statutory minimum); Smoothstack v. Davis, Nos. GV21010149, GV21015875 (Va. Gen. Dist. Ct.) (unconscionability); See Heder v. City of Two Rivers, 149 F. Supp. 2d 677, 694 (E.D. Wis. 2001), vacated sub nom. Heder v. City of Two Rivers, Wisconsin, 295 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2002); Med+Plus, 726 N.E.2d at 693 (finding amount to be repaid a penalty intended to prevent employee from leaving, rather than recoupment of training expenses, because it bore no relation to employer’s unrecovered training costs). Stay-or-pay contracts may also be subject to the Consumer Financial Protection Act’s prohibitions on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices in consumer financial products or services because of the debt obligations they create. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a). Additionally, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Transportation may have jurisdiction to regulate such agreements under their unfair or deceptive acts or practices authorities in their respective organic statutes. 49 U.S.C. §§ 41712(a); 15 U.S.C. § 45(a); see Governing for Impact, et. al memo regarding stay-or-pay contract regulation at the Department of Transportation, (Oct. 19, 2023), https://governingforimpact.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/DOT-FAA-Stay-Or-Pay-Memo.pdf; The Department of Health and Human Services may also have the authority to regulate such practices as part of its regulation of healthcare facilities that receive Medicare patients. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(9); see also 42 C.F.R. § 482.1(a)(1)(ii) (“The Secretary may impose additional requirements if they are found necessary in the interest of the health and safety of the individuals who are furnished services in hospitals.”); see generally American Economic Liberties Project letter to White House Competition Council, (May 30, 2023),
staying in an otherwise unacceptable job.26 In fact, some employers actively reference the existence of the contract in reply to worker concerns about job conditions.27 Several FENs spoke with NBC News on the condition of anonymity to describe why they weren’t able to quit unsafe jobs.28 One described being unable to leave her job — at which she felt unsafe — after her employer threatened an $100,000 lawsuit.29 Another FEN wanted to leave his job because he was being paid lower wages than his co-workers and unpaid overtime, but he would face a $45,000 penalty for breaking his five-year contract after one year. “It’s this feeling of being in a cell and not being able to freely do what you want,” explained the nurse.30 Yet another nurse decided to return to their job after the hospital sent a post-resignation letter demanding that the nurse either pay the hospital $18,000 or return to work and complete the two-year/4,000 hour requirement.31

This pressure can make it difficult for FENs to speak up about low or unfair wages and unsafe working conditions, including discrimination. Employers of FENs reportedly mandate excessive overtime, place nurses in severely understaffed facilities, and fail to provide sufficient training.32 As alluded to above, FENs are also commonly underpaid when compared to their domestic counterparts.33 One study found that the likelihood of poor treatment of FENs compared to domestic nurses was higher for nurses from low-income countries (versus high-income countries) and for those recruited by staffing agencies (versus hired directly by a health system).34

Though not the focus of this memorandum, recent litigation under the forced labor prohibition in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, summarized in an HHS report, illustrates that the exploitative pressure enabled by stay-or-pay contracts for FENs can potentially subject employers to civil and even criminal liability.35 In one case, a New York federal district judge ruled in favor of a class of plaintiff nurses recruited from the Philippines on claims arising out of a contract utilized by a recruiting agency.36 In that case, a Filipino-registered agency had recruited nurses in the Philippines for a job at a nursing home in New York. The nurses were required to sign a stay-or-pay contract that included a $25,000 liquidated damages clause, as well as a separate document requiring reimbursement of various recruitment costs. Upon the nurses’ arrival in

http://www.economicliberties.us/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/2022-05-30-Competition-Council-Noncompetes-Lette r.pdf (outlining various authorities that agencies may have to regulate non-compete agreements).

26 CFPB Report; see also Stein v. HHGREGG, Inc., 873 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2017) quoting Mich. Att’y Gen. of Governmental Empl. v. Mich. Dept’t of Corr., 992 F.2d 82, 86 (6th Cir. 1993) (in the context of an unenforced commission policy, explaining that unenforced policies or unenforceable debts can have significant practical effects on how people live: “[s]imply because a [policy] has never been applied does not mean that the employee has not been affected by the policy”).

27 CFPB Report.


29 Id.

30 Id.

31 CFPB Report.

32 NNU Comment at 24 quoting Pittman report.

33 Pittman Report at 5 (explaining that employers withhold pay from and underpay FENs); See generally Shannon Pettypiece, Trapped at work: Immigrant health care workers can face harsh working conditions and $100,000 lawsuits for quitting, NBC News, (Jun. 4, 2023), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/economics/trapped-work-immigrant-health-care-workers-can-face-harsh-working-c ond-rena83979 (FENs “described being paid less than their American counterparts despite immigration laws that require they be paid the local prevailing wage”).


35 HHS Report.

the United States, their contracts were assigned to a different nursing staffing agency, which assigned them to other nursing homes. After nearly one year at the nursing home, the lead plaintiff resigned because of understaffing and overworking. The defendants immediately sued the plaintiff and other nurses to enforce the liquidated damages provision, and to seek an additional $250,000 for “tortious interference with contract and prospective business relations.” The court found the liquidated damages provision to be an unenforceable penalty under New York state law. Additionally, the court found that the $25,000 liquidated damages provision was sufficient to count as a threat of “serious harm” under the TVPA, in part because of the particular vulnerabilities of the nurses as “recent immigrants to the United States.”

In *Magtoles v. United Staffing Registry, Inc.*, a staffing agency imposed a three-year liquidated damages provision and a non-compete clause on FENs. A plaintiff in the case explained that she attempted to quit because she was overworked and the conditions were not safe for her patients. The court found that the liquidated damages provision violated the TVPA, noting that the threatened financial penalties fit within Congress’ broad definition of serious harm under the forced labor prohibition, which includes instances “in which personas are held in a condition of servitude through nonviolent coercion.” The court cited the difficult work environment, plaintiffs’ reliance on their employer for understanding of the contract, reluctance to complain to the United States embassy due to potential immigration consequences, and the plaintiffs’ lack of bargaining power as particular vulnerabilities of the FENs.

C. Adverse effects on domestic nurses

Restrictive employment contracts among FENs have negative impacts on domestically-trained workers. First, when healthcare employers have access to highly captive labor like FENs that is restricted by fears of immigration consequences and particular requirements about visa sponsorship and stay-or-pay contracts, they may be less likely to offer jobs to U.S.-trained nurses in the first place.

Second, if employers are able to constrain FENs’ demands for better wages and working conditions through stay-or-pay contract-enabled coercion, U.S.-trained workers may have to reduce their demands and accept poorer wages and conditions to compete for jobs. As the DOL asserted in its 2007 final rule that prohibited employers from accepting worker reimbursements for costs associated with labor certification:

> An alien employee who reimburses his employer via deductions from his paycheck or a lump payment is effectively being paid a lower wage than agreed to by the employer on the labor certification. A U.S. worker is non-competitive with the alien worker unless he too accepts the actual lower wage. Therefore, the practice of aliens reimbursing employers for expenses the employer incurred in the labor certification process adversely affects the compensation of U.S. workers.

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39 Id. at *18.
43 Id.
44 Many nurses are brought in under Schedule A, which removes employers’ obligation to post a job for domestic workers at all. United State Citizenship and Immigration Service, Policy Manual Chapter 7, (Accessed: Oct. 23, 2023), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-6-part-e-chapter-7 (explaining that “an employer who wishes to hire a person for a Schedule A occupation is not required to conduct a test of the labor market and apply for a permanent labor certification with DOL”).
45 Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor, Labor Certification for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States; Reducing the Incentives and Opportunities for Fraud and Abuse and Enhancing Program Integrity, 72 Fed. Reg. 27904, 27921 (May 17, 2007).
Research shows that restrictive employment contracts like non-compete clauses and stay-or-pay contracts tend to suppress wages in the sectors in which they are common. Several studies demonstrate the connection between non-compete clauses and wage suppression, including one that found that decreasing non-compete clause enforceability from the approximate enforceability level of the fifth-strictest state to that of the fifth-most-lax state would increase workers' earnings by 3-4%.

Stay-or-pay contracts like TRAPs and breach fees used to be concentrated exclusively among health systems and staffing agencies recruiting FENs, but no longer. Now, due to the provisions' proven ability to restrain workers' opportunities in the employment-based visa realm, healthcare systems and staffing agencies use the same types of stay-or-pay contracts when hiring U.S.-trained workers. U.S.-trained workers are compelled to accept these conditions, in part because employers can just turn to more exploitable foreign labor if U.S.-trained workers refuse. Additionally, despite regulations prohibiting the practice, many employers offer lower wages to FENs than to similarly educated or employed domestically-trained workers. This can both encourage employers' use of FENs over domestically-trained nurses and reduce the ability of nurses to bargain for better wages.

Finally, this dynamic exacerbates the underlying problem that has made FENs so important: a shortage of domestic nursing labor. If wages and conditions continue to deteriorate for workers in the U.S.—including deterioration associated with stay-or-pay contracts — fewer U.S.-trained nurses will seek or stay in these jobs, which will only heighten our dependence on FENs.

### D. Adverse effects on patient safety and health

Stay-or-pay contracts in nursing may also threaten patient health and safety in several ways. As NNU explained in a comment to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “when employers hold nurses hostage as debtors, it makes it difficult for nurses to speak up about unsafe working conditions and to advocate for their patients to ensure they receive safe and effective nursing care.” In survey comments and interviews with NNU, registered nurses frequently reported “being required to work in units that had dangerously low nurse-to-patient ratios.” The employee in the DOL complaint referenced above, for example, wanted to quit primarily because of his concerns about patient safety, which he raised with his employer to no avail. He eventually “grew deeply concerned that he could not meet his ethical and professional responsibilities under [his employer's] working conditions, including a heavy patient load that he believed in good faith did not permit him to provide adequate patient care” and began suffering physical and mental health harms from his employment. An SEIU regulatory comment identified the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center as a

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47 See Pittman report.
48 See, e.g., Shannon Pettipiece, *Trapped at work: Immigrant health care workers can face harsh working conditions and $100,000 lawsuits for quitting*, NBC News, (Jun. 4, 2023), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/economics/trapped-work-immigrant-health-care-workers-can-face-harsh-working-conditions-rcna83979 (FENs “described being paid less than their American counterparts despite immigration laws that require they be paid the local prevailing wage”).
50 NNU Comment; see also Shannon Pettipiece, *Indentured servitude*: Nurses hit with hefty debt when trying to leave hospitals, NBC News, (Mar. 12, 2023), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/economics/indentured-servitude-nurses-hit-heavy-debt-trying-leave-hospitals-rcna74204 (quoting a regulatory policy specialist at National Nurses United who stated, “[t]hinking that debt hanging over them means that nurses have a harder time advocating for safe conditions for themselves and their patients.”)
51 NNU Comment at 14.
52 DOL Complaint at 8.
healthcare employer that has a “well-documented history of retaliating against workers” who speak up about workplace issues, but explained that workers would be less able to speak up about working conditions because of the stay-or-pay provisions in their employment contracts.\(^5^4\)

Trapping workers in toxic working conditions can also contribute to burnout. Burnout and toxic work environments for medical workers has been found to increase rates of medical error.\(^5^5\) A plaintiff nurse in one of the TVPA cases mentioned above explained in her deposition testimony that she resigned because “we were overworked and it is giving me almost every day anxiety whenever I go to work. It’s not safe for the patients. And I even question myself if I want to be a nurse because I cannot provide quality care for my patients.”\(^5^6\) One FEN interviewed by NBC News, whose employer sued her for more than $100,000 when she resigned, described how she was often the only nurse for as many as 30 patients, which resulted in missed medications and patients’ falls.\(^5^7\) Another explained that she quit because she was afraid her working conditions would cause her to accidentally harm a patient, but most of her colleagues remained in their jobs because of the debt scheme.\(^5^8\)

III. Current State

A. Regulatory framework for FENs

Most FENs come into the United States under the EB-3 employment-based visa, which is designed for skilled workers, professionals, and some other workers.\(^5^9\) Employers that recruit workers under the EB-3 program must first request a prevailing wage determination from the DOL.\(^6^0\) Then, they submit to the DOL an application for Permanent Employment Certification (“Form 9089”).\(^6^1\) As part of that application, they must attest to having taken steps to recruiting United States workers for the position, among other commitments.\(^6^2\) The DOL will approve the application upon determining that the labor certification will not


\(^{60}\) 20 C.F.R. § 656.40.

\(^{61}\) 20 C.F.R. § 656.17.

\(^{62}\) 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(c).
“adversely affect” U.S. workers. Upon approval, the employer can then submit their immigrant petition to the Department of Homeland Security, attaching their DOL certification. The DHS will consider several factors when deciding whether to approve the immigrant petition, including whether the employer has demonstrated an ability to pay the immigrant a wage and whether the immigrant in fact received the training or degrees required by the desired visa category. Finally, the worker can apply for the visa at the U.S. consulate abroad.

There is an expedited process for professional nurses, called Schedule A, which is essentially a blanket determination by DOL that there are not sufficient workers in the United States for a particular occupation and that recruiting individuals for the occupation will not “adversely affect” U.S. workers. This allows the employer to go straight to DHS without submitting their application for permanent labor certification to the DOL. While the employer must still make the same attestations (with the exception of verifying that they’ve attempted to recruit domestic workers for the position) and submit documentation of postsecondary degrees required for the Schedule A designation, they do not have to wait for DOL certification before submitting the immigrant petition to DHS.

B. Regulatory, litigation, and advocacy efforts

There has been some enforcement and proposed regulation of similar restrictive employment clauses at other federal agencies, but no such regulation specifically regarding the employment-based visa system. For example, the FTC has proposed to ban traditional and some forms of de facto non-compete contracts in a forthcoming rule. However, nonprofit entities are arguably exempt from the FTC Act, under which that rule was proposed. Almost half of all hospitals are technically not-for-profit. Additionally, the DOL’s recently-filed lawsuit referenced above was based on minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). However, even if the DOL had the resources to vigorously go after each instance in which anti-competitive contracts caused employers to violate the FLSA, many healthcare workers may earn too much to fall within the law’s bare-minimum protections.

As explained above and in a recent HHS report, there has been private litigation against healthcare employers of FENs under the TVPA. Some plaintiffs have been successful. However, there is an obvious lack of disclosure about the use of the contracts, which is a barrier to filing an action in the first place. And, as at least one court noted, the absence of an express DOL regulation concerning the types of permitted liquidated damages provisions is a gap in the regulatory scheme.

States have also entered the regulatory and litigation fray. In Illinois, lawmakers recently prohibited nursing staffing agencies from entering no-poaching agreements and charging nurses breach fees if they are hired for permanent positions at health system employers. In 2022, the New York Attorney General’s office settled

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63 20 C.F.R. § 656.2(c)(1)(ii)
64 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).
65 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii).
66 20 C.F.R. § 656.15(a).
70 Department of Labor, Department Of Labor Seeks Court Order To Stop Brooklyn Staffing Agency From Demanding Employees Stay 3 Years Or Repay Wages, (Mar. 20, 2023), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/sol/sol20230320.
71 Paguirigan v. Prompt Nursing Emp. Agency LLC, No. 17-CV-1302 (NG) (JO), 2019 WL 4647648, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2019), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, 827 F. App’x 116 (2d Cir. 2020) (explaining that defendants’ reference to H-1B regulations permitting bona fide liquidated damages is irrelevant because no such regulations apply to EB-3s, which was the visa category at issue).
with a health system that illegally charged FENs for resigning or being fired within the first three years of employment.\textsuperscript{73} Similarly, in 2005, the New Jersey Attorney General's office settled with a nurse staffing agency, requiring the company to revise its employment agreements to eliminate a liquidated damages clause.\textsuperscript{74}

Most recently, the nursing union NNU has led regulatory advocacy against stay-or-pay contracts in the healthcare sector. In response to an HHS request for information on forced labor in the public health supply chain, NNU relied heavily on research from Dr. Patricia Pittman to explain the unique and pervasive use of these exploitative contracts in employment-based visa recruiting.\textsuperscript{75} In a comment in response to the CFPB’s request for information on employer-driven debt practices, NNU detailed the results of its survey of registered nurses on the subject.\textsuperscript{76} The comment explained how employer-driven debt arrangements like TRAPs create unsafe and unfair conditions for nurses and their patients, and identified other troublesome employer practices in the industry. NNU also submitted a comment on an FTC and DOJ merger enforcement request for information asking the agencies to consider the "emergence of coercive employment contracts, including nurse training repayment agreements."\textsuperscript{77}

\section*{IV. Proposed Action}

\textit{A. Legal authority}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Statutory authority}
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Before the DOL approves an application for permanent labor certification, the INA requires that it first find that “there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified … at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor” and that such certification “will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.”\textsuperscript{78} It is upon this statutory basis that the DOL constructed the regulatory scheme that governs the employment visa process for various visa categories, including EB-3 (under which the vast majority of FENs enter the country).

The INA’s first dictate – that “there are not sufficient workers” – requires the DOL to make a “good faith test” of U.S. worker availability.\textsuperscript{79} Because requiring a case-by-case inquiry into the labor market conditions relevant to each employer’s request for certification would be too resource-intensive for the agency, courts have upheld DOL regulations that allow employers to submit a tranche of documentation attesting that the employers have tested the market themselves.\textsuperscript{80} Additionally, courts have approved of regulations, such as a prohibition on alien self-employment, promulgated to reinforce the efficacy of employer-driven labor market testing and ensure the integrity of the information collected by the agency.\textsuperscript{81}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{74} New Jersey Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General and Division of Consumer Affairs Reach $134,000 Settlement with Health Care Service Firm, (Aug. 22, 2005), https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases05/pr20050822a.html.
\item \textsuperscript{75} NNU Comment.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{77} National Nurses United comment on Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Request for Information 14, (Apr. 21, 2022), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2022-0003-1831.
\item \textsuperscript{78} 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i)(I).
\item \textsuperscript{79} Bulk Farms, Inc. \textit{v.} Martin, 963 F.2d 1286, 1287 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding a regulation that prohibited alien self-employment).
\item \textsuperscript{81} Bulk Farms, Inc. \textit{v. Martin}, 963 F.2d 1286, 1287 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding a regulation that prohibited alien self-employment).
\end{itemize}
Prohibiting employers’ use of restrictive employment contracts like noncompetes and stay-or-pay contracts, and requiring documentation of compliance, would improve the integrity of employers’ “good faith test” of the labor market. The degree to which a worker is dependent on an employer and restricted in their mobility with respect to that employer is one factor in a worker’s “attractiveness” to an employer. Foreign workers on these visas are already more dependent on employers because of actual and perceived dependence created by the visa sponsorship process. If FENs are further immobilized by these types of contracts, that may incentivize an employer to temper their search for U.S. workers because foreign workers are all-the-more captive. This dynamic undermines the INA’s mission of ensuring that foreign workers are recruited only if there are not sufficient workers in the United States.

The INA’s second requirement — that labor certification approval not “adversely affect” U.S. workers — is a statutory condition common to a myriad of different visa programs. Although there is scant caselaw elucidating the meaning of “adversely affect” in the EB-3 context, courts have found that similar “adversely affect” language that governs other kinds of labor certifications endows DOL with significant discretion to strike the appropriate balance between ensuring an adequate labor supply and protecting the jobs of domestic workers.\[82\]

The Department can issue regulations under this statutory language to establish a baseline “acceptable” standard for working conditions for visa workers below which workers in the United States would be adversely affected.\[83\] Courts have approvingly cited regulations, implemented under the “adversely affected” language in the H-2A program, that require that foreign workers be provided with “housing, meals, equipment, and transportation.”\[84\] Without such minimum conditions, workers on employment-based visas might be more attractive to employers than U.S. workers because of their exploitability as relatively more captive labor. According to one federal court, this would “adversely affect” workers in the United States, either by causing employers to hire through visa programs without making a good faith effort to hire domestically, or by forcing U.S. workers to accept worse working conditions or wages in order to compete with foreign labor.\[85\]

As previewed in Section II(C), the prohibitions and requirements recommended in this memorandum would help ensure that the employment of FENs does not “adversely affect” the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States. First, as explained above, permitting employers to impose restrictive employment agreements like stay-or-pay contracts and noncompetes increases the immobility of already-captive workers, making them more exploitable by employers. This increases the likelihood that U.S. workers would have to assent to such restrictive conditions in order to compete for jobs — thus “adversely affecting” their working conditions in violation of the statute. This justification is similar to previous DOL analyses regarding the coercive effects of employer-driven debt in similar contexts.\[86\] Second, requiring FENs to take on debt loads — by signing stay-or-pay contracts — reduces the effective wage that employers are paying FENs, as the looming obligation to repay deprives them of a “free and clear” wage or an actual repayment causes them to have a negative wage in their final work week.\[87\] This may require workers in the United States to accept lower actual wages in order to compete with foreign labor. Third, noncompetes have been shown to

\[83\] *Garcia-Celestino v. Ruiz Harvesting, Inc.*, 843 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016).  
\[84\] Id.  
\[85\] Id.  
\[86\] See, e.g., Employment and Training Administration, Labor Certification Process and Enforcement for Temporary Employment in Occupations Other Than Agriculture or Registered Nursing in the United States (H-2B Workers), and Other Technical Changes, 73 Fed. Reg. 78020, 78037 (implementing various changes, including requiring employers to cover certain expenses, to the H-2B visa program to reduce “conditions akin to indentured servitude, driving down wages and working conditions for all workers, foreign and domestic”).  
suppress wages by reducing labor market competition.\textsuperscript{88} Allowing the proliferation of restrictive employment contracts would thus have the effect of “adversely affecting” U.S. worker wages.

2. Regulatory history

The DOL has issued several regulations modifying the permanent labor certification process that governs, among other categories, EB-3 visas, all of which are based on the statutory language cited above. The DOL has relied upon the statutory language described above to impose requirements on employers related to both workers’ wages (e.g., that they are paid the local prevailing wage\textsuperscript{89}) and working conditions (e.g., that the conditions be “normal to the occupation in the area and industry”\textsuperscript{90}). For example, in 2004 the DOL revamped the certification process. The final regulation imposed myriad requirements, including that employers applying for certification for live-in domestic workers attest to the fact that they provide private room and board to the worker free-of-charge.\textsuperscript{91}

In 2007, the DOL issued additional regulations governing the process for permanent labor certification, again based on the same statutory predicates. The new rules sought to “enhance program integrity and reduce the incentives and opportunities for fraud and abuse” in the system.\textsuperscript{92} Among others, the final rule prohibited the sale, barter, or purchase of certifications and applications, and barred employers from permitting aliens to pay the costs of their own labor certification. Note how the DOL justified the latter restriction, still in effect today at 20 C.F.R. § 656.12, in the terms of the statute:

> [p]ermanent labor certification is an employer-driven process; employers, not aliens, must file permanent labor certification applications. To the extent the alien beneficiary who is the subject of the labor certification application and, later, the immigrant petition, is financially involved in the application process directly or indirectly, this involvement casts suspicion on the integrity of the process and the existence of a bona fide job opportunity…

> …[a]n alien employee who reimburses his employer via deductions from his paycheck or a lump payment is effectively being paid a lower wage than agreed to by the employer on the labor certification. A U.S. worker is non-competitive with the alien worker unless he too accepts the actual lower wage. Therefore, the practice of aliens reimbursing employers for expenses the employer incurred in the labor certification process adversely affects the compensation of U.S. workers.\textsuperscript{93}

Although not specifically applicable to the EB-3 program or the permanent labor certification process, the DOL has also issued regulations based on similar job market test and “adversely affect” language on employers seeking certification for other visa categories. Those regulations, among other things, increased the wage requirements for agricultural workers to ensure that U.S. workers would not be adversely affected by competition;\textsuperscript{94} required employers to cover inbound transportation and other costs;\textsuperscript{95} and otherwise sought to


\textsuperscript{90} Id. at 77394.

\textsuperscript{91} Id. at 77358.

\textsuperscript{92} Employment and Training Administration, Labor Certification for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States; Reducing the Incentives and Opportunities for Fraud and Abuse and Enhancing Program Integrity, 72 Fed. Reg. 27904, 27904 (May 17, 2007).

\textsuperscript{93} Id. at 27921 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{94} Employment and Training Administration, Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States, 88 FR 12760, 12765, (Feb. 28, 2023).

reduce workers’ indebtedness to their employers to prevent the creation of “conditions akin to indentured servitude, driving down wages and working conditions for all workers, foreign and domestic.”96

These examples demonstrate how the DOL has interpreted the job market test and “adversely affect” language of the INA to authorize the agency to impose common-sense restrictions on alien employment meant to protect visa holders, from exploitation at the hand of employers, and U.S. workers, from unfair competitive pressures of having to compete with a vulnerable and exploitable workforce.

B. Proposals: issue a new regulation via notice-and-comment rulemaking that requires attestation and documentation to demonstrate that employers are not using stay-or-pay contracts to immobilize FENs

The DOL should adopt the following regulatory changes to ensure that FENs are not subject to exploitative noncompete and stay-or-pay contracts. These proposals assume the continued existence of Schedule A for nursing professionals. If, for whatever reason, Schedule A is not in effect at the time of these reforms, proposal #3 below would be obsolete.97

1. Adding a new attestation to Form 9089 at 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(c)(11) that workers brought in under a permanent labor certification will not be subject to a charge if they are fired, resign, or attempt to find work with a different employer. This would fit the character of 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(c) attestations that ensure that employers conduct a bona fide job market test and that alien employment will not adversely affect U.S. workers, such as the §656.10(c)(6) assurance that the job is not open as a result of an organized labor action and the §656.10(c)(1)-(2) assurances that the job offer includes a prevailing wage. False attestations would be punishable under the agency’s debarment procedures98 and several federal statutes that prohibit making false statements to government agencies,99 particularly in the context of visa misuse.100

2. Adding a subsection to 20 C.F.R. § 656.12 that explicitly forbids employers from attempting to impose or imposing a charge on workers if they are fired, resign, or attempt to find work with a different employer. This would fit neatly alongside the existing 20 C.F.R. § 656.12 prohibitions that ensure that certification does not circumvent a bona fide job market test and does not adversely affect U.S. workers, such as the §656.12(a) prohibition on selling or trading labor certifications and the §656.12(b) prohibition on foreign workers covering the costs of the labor certification process. Violations would again be punishable under the agency’s debarment procedures101 and various federal statutes.

3. Amending 20 C.F.R. § 656.15(a) to require employers seeking to use Schedule A to submit along with their application to DHS a copy of the employment contract that they plan to enter into with the immigrant worker. Additionally, the regulation should require a copy of the Form 9089 and employment contract to be sent to DOL/ETA. This component would ensure that the DOL has access to this information, even if the employer’s certification qualifies for Schedule A.

4. Adding a new subsection to 20 C.F.R. § 656.17(a) that requires employers to submit along with their Form 9089 a copy of the employment contract that they plan to use with the immigrant worker and amending 20 C.F.R. § 656.17(j) to prohibit stay-or-pay contracts.

96 Employment and Training Administration, Labor Certification Process and Enforcement for Temporary Employment in Occupations Other Than Agriculture or Registered Nursing in the United States (H-2B Workers), and Other Technical Changes, 73 Fed. Reg. 78020, 78037. (emphasis added).

97 Though this does not seem likely, as the Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence directed the DOL to update Schedule A to include new occupational categories. See Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence Section 5.1(e), (October 30, 2023).

98 See generally 20 C.F.R. § 656.31.


100 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1546.

101 See generally 20 C.F.R. § 656.31.
Making comprehensive updates to general permanent labor certification regulations, as proposed in #1 and #2 above, Schedule A regulations, as proposed in #3 above, and the basic labor certification process, as proposed in #4 above, carries with it the benefits of ensuring regulatory consistency across occupational categories (e.g. healthcare staff, like nursing assistants, that may not qualify for Schedule A) and anticipating potential future changes to Schedule A.

V. Conclusion

Employers’ use of non-compete and stay-or-pay contracts to further constrain an already-vulnerable workforce has negative effects on workers in the United States, patients’ health and safety, as well as on FENs themselves. The Department of Labor should take steps to reduce the use of restrictive employment contractors in this sector, which would protect FENs from exploitation and safeguard the wages and working conditions of American workers.